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"The intuition can be genuine, but the interpretation can get fouled up."1 - 
Ken Wilber 
Part I: In Defense of the Deep Ecology Movement 
Modern environmentalists and spiritual traditions in sympathy with them constitute a 
great and dangerous error, according to Ken Wilber in his new books Sex, Ecology, 
Spirituality, and . Brief History of Everything. Wilber argues this in spite of agreeing that 
we face a serious ecological crisis, and that he is "in complete sympathy" with the attempt 
by many contemporary people to recapture the ecological wisdom of earlier tribal 
peoples.2 
Emerson's "Critique" of "Nature Worship" 
Wilber views Deep Ecology and nature religions such as Neopagan spirituality, as 
psychologically and spiritually regressive, beckoning their practitioners back to a pre-
modern level of intellectual and spiritual development. To lend weight to his assertion, 
Wilber cites a provocative quotation from Ralph Waldo Emerson who, he tells us, is 
criticizing "nature religion". 
To the senses and the unrenewed understanding, belongs a sort of 
instinctive belief in the absolute existence of nature. In their view man and 
nature are indissolubly joined. Things are ultimates, and they never look 
beyond their sphere [Piaget's egocentric "realism"] His mind is imbruted, 
and he is a selfish savage. 
The presence of intuition mars his faith [in nature]. The first effort of 
thought tends to relax this despotism of the senses which binds us to nature 
as if we were a part of it. Until this higher agency intervened [intuition], the 
animal eye sees, with wonderful accuracy, sharp outlines and colored 
surfaces. When the eye of intuition opens, to outline and surface are at once 
added grace and expression. These proceed from imagination and affection, 
and abate somewhat of the angular distinction of objects. If the intuition be 
stimulated to more earnest vision, outlines of surfaces become transparent, 
and are no longer seen. . . . The best moments of life are these delicious 
awakenings of the higher powers, and the reverential withdrawal of nature 
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before its God.3 
This quotation is pivotal for Wilber's argument. About 200 pages later he refers to it 
again, emphasizing that ". . . In their view [the Eco camp's view] man and nature are 
indissolubly joined. Things are ultimates, and they never look beyond their sphere. His 
mind is imbruted and he is a selfish savage."4 
Wilber tells us that nature's relationship with Spirit takes one of three forms. The first he 
terms "magical indissociation" where spirit and nature are simply equated, resulting in a 
very this worldly perspective. Second is "mythic dissociation" where spirit and nature are 
considered separate and utterly distinct. Third is "psychic mysticism" such as Emerson's, 
where Spirit and nature are joined, with nature a subset of Spirit. 
According to Wilber, spiritual enlightenment gradually ascends through a series of stages. 
Every person attaining higher stages must first go through the lower ones. One of the 
lowest is that of immersion within nature where our sense of self has not yet been 
developed. According to Wilber, nature mysticism is a return to this pre-personal state of 
awareness - a classic case of what Wilber terms the "pre-trans fallacy" where pre-personal 
states of awareness are confused with transpersonal states. 
In Wilber's view, Emerson is a particularly powerful witness against the "nature 
worshippers", for Emerson was able to perceive the divine reality of which nature was 
merely a reflection. To be sure, Emerson is often referred to as a nature mystic. But 
Wilber argues this is misleading because "this psychic-level mysticism embraces not just 
nature but also culture, and calling it nature mysticism confuses it with merely biocentric 
regression. . ."5 
Wilber contends that the "nature mysticism" so popular today with environmentalists and 
within the Pagan revival is simply the first, and most regressive, form of spirituality. As 
such, it is far more spiritually limited than even the secular rationalism against which its 
adherents rebel.6 He emphasizes that "Indeed, if nature means the biosphere, and Nature 
(or Spirit) means the All, means the physiosphere and the biosphere and the noosphere 
and their Ground, then Emerson's point is very simple: the worshippers of nature are the 
destroyers of Nature." This is why Emerson "maintains that nature immersion and nature 
worship prevent the realization of Nature, or the Spirit within and beyond, that transcends 
all, embraces all."7 The ecological mystics, deep ecologists, and nature worshippers are 
at odds with the spiritual insights of men like Emerson. For them "Nature was valued 
because of the thrill it sent swishing through the ego in `pristine' wilderness encounters. 
Not a transparency to the Divine, but the divine ego reflected to itself in monological 
feeling."8 
If one of the West's greatest advocates of divinity in nature can in fact be called in as a 
witness against those of us who advocate the presence of deep ecological and even 
spiritual values in nature, it would seem that the intellectual and spiritual foundation for 
much of modern environmental and alternative spiritual thought may be utterly bankrupt. 
Wilber's challenge could not be more direct. 
And yet, despite their gravity, Wilber's charges are completely untenable. Most 
amazingly, Wilber's use of Ralph Waldo Emerson as the centerpiece of his argument 
against nature worship is a fabrication. Emerson never said what Wilber describes him as 
saying. The quotation as Wilber presents it contains a misleading sentence fragment 
which comes from elsewhere in Emerson's Nature.9 In a footnote Wilber admits to 
making one change. He replaced Emerson's word "Reason" with "intuition." But far more 
significant changes are left unmentioned. 
What Emerson Really Said
Emerson's quotation as edited is so distorted that I will give my readers his real words, so 
they may see for themselves. I have put into italics those words Wilber deleted from 
Emerson's quote, and leave out the words he added: 
To the senses and the unrenewed understanding, belongs a sort of 
instinctive belief in the absolute existence of nature. In their view man and 
nature are indissolubly joined. Things are ultimates, and they never look 
beyond their sphere. The presence of Reason mars this faith. The first effort 
of thought tends to relax this despotism of the senses which binds us to 
nature as if we were a part of it, and shows us nature aloof, and, as it were, 
afloat. Until this higher agency intervened, the animal eye sees, with 
wonderful accuracy, sharp outlines and colored surfaces. When the eye of 
Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once added grace and 
expression. These proceed from imagination and affection, and abate 
somewhat of the angular distinctness of objects. If the Reason be 
stimulated to more earnest vision, outlines and surfaces become 
transparent, and are no longer seen; causes and spirits are seen through 
them. The best moments of life are these delicious awakenings of the 
higher powers, and the reverential withdrawing of nature before its God.10 
The phrase Wilber added, "His mind is imbruted and he is a selfish savage," can be found 
pages later in a different chapter.11 
By omitting "causes and spirits are seen through them" Wilber radically changes 
Emerson's conclusion, eliminating textual evidence that Emerson himself saw no problem 
in acknowledging as spiritually significant both an ultimate divine source to all that is and 
a diversity of spiritual phenomena as emanations from that source. This is precisely the 
experience that links nature religions with the insight that such a source exists. For 
example, the Lakota, Navajo, Crow, and traditional Wiccan spiritual traditions all 
acknowledge such an Ultimate Source, but focus varying amounts of their attention 
elsewhere, for reasons that will become plain later in this essay.12 
Wilber's insertion of the "mind is imbruted" phrase suggests that for Emerson nature 
mysticism is a degenerate form of consciousness. But, when seen in context, Emerson's 
entire text says nothing about nature worship. Emerson is in fact criticizing the ordinary 
day to day taken-for-granted understanding of unreflective men and women. That is, 
people who see the external world as simply a bunch of objects, either useful or useless. 
This, of course, is exactly the kind of understanding that both deep ecologists and nature 
mystics also criticize. The "selfish savage" passage which Wilber inserted into the longer 
quote, appears in this context: 
At present, man applies to nature but half his force. He works on the world 
with his understanding alone. He lives in it and masters it by a penny-
wisdom; and he that works most in it is but a half-man, and whilst his arms 
are strong and his digestion good, his mind is imbruted, and he is a selfish 
savage. His relation to nature, his power over it, is through the 
understanding, as by manure; the economic use of fire, wind, water, and the 
mariner's needle; steam, coal, chemical agriculture; the repairs of the 
human body by the dentist and the surgeon.13 
By no stretch of the imagination can this passage be read as a criticism of nature worship. 
Nor can it be said to refer to Jean Piaget's "egocentric realism". In Piaget's thought 
egocentrism occurs in childhood, before a true ego has been developed. Wilber himself 
observed: "The young child is, in Piaget's terms, totally egocentric - meaning not that he 
thinks selfishly only about himself, but to the contrary, that he is incapable of thinking 
about himself. The egocentric child is incapable of distinguishing himself from the rest of 
the world."14 Wilber's parenthetical remark is at best, deeply confused regarding 
Emerson or Piaget or both.15 
In fact, Emerson's views towards the sacredness of nature come closer to those of many 
deep ecology supporters and nature mystics than they do to Ken Wilber. In chapter VII, 
"Spirit," Emerson writes that "The happiest man is he who learns from nature the lesson 
of worship." He elaborates that 
Of that ineffable essence which we call Spirit, he that thinks most, will say 
least. We can foresee God in the coarse, and, as it were, distant phenomena 
of matter; but when we try to define and describe himself, both language 
and thought desert us, and we are as helpless as fools and savages. That 
essence refuses to be recorded in propositions, but when man has 
worshipped him intellectually, the noblest ministry of nature is to stand as 
the apparition of God. It is the organ through which the universal spirit 
speaks to the individual, and strives to lead back the individual to it.16 
Towards the end of this chapter Emerson observes 
The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter 
and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious. 
But it differs from the body in one important respect. It is not, like that, 
now subjected to the human will. Its serene order is inviolable by us. It is, 
therefore, to us, the present expositor of the divine mind. It is a fixed point 
whereby we may measure our departure. As we degenerate, the contrast 
between us and our house is more evident. We are as much strangers in 
nature as we are aliens from God.17 
These two quotations, and the chapter they are drawn from, occur in between the two 
quotes which Wilber cobbled together as "evidence" that Emerson was attacking "nature 
worship." How could he have missed them? Emerson is frequently but selectively quoted 
in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, giving a truncated view of his true beliefs. 
But then, Emerson's full views do not fit Wilber's own thoughts on the matter. For 
Wilber, any encounter with Spirit and nature would see Spirit flowing "through me and 
into nature." Supposedly with the nature spirituality he attacks, "No longer did Spirit or 
the Over-Soul shine through me and illuminate nature with a spiritual radiance, disclosing 
nature as a perfect manifestation of Spirit. Rather, now I am flooded by feelings released 
in myself by and from a mononature." 18 
Given Wilber's claim to a nondualist spiritual perspective, it is significant to encounter 
his repeated emphasis of the one way character of the relationship between ourselves, 
nature, and Spirit: "Nature is not the source of this spiritual splendor but rather its 
destination. When I can relax my egoic contraction (and many people appropriately find 
nature a fit and inviting place for this more easily to happen), then I can relax into the 
great Over-Soul, and then through me comes rushing the spiritual splendor of the One. . . 
."19 In support of this view, Wilber again quotes Emerson that "the spirit does not build 
up nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the tree puts forth new 
branches and leaves through the pores of the old."20 
The problem with Wilber's interpretation is that plenty of other passages in the same text 
support different interpretations. For example, just before the passage Wilber quotes, 
Emerson wrote that "The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a 
remoter and inferior incarnation of God . . . ."21 In addition, as quoted above, for 
Emerson nature "is the organ through which the universal spirit speaks. . . ." These 
quotations suggest a very different relationship between ourselves and nature than that 
emphasized by Wilber. 
Even in the inaccurate quotation that Wilber cites, Emerson wrote "When the eye of 
Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once added grace and expression." With even 
"more earnest vision, outlines and surfaces become transparent . . . causes and spirits are 
seen through them." Neither of Wilber's two options of Nature as sources or as 
destination of spiritual splendor are described. Emerson is writing in terms of vision. As 
my vision improves I see more out there, in nature, through it and pervading it. 
In the face of so many superficially conflicting descriptions we might conclude that 
Emerson was simply confused. In such a case it is illegitimate to pick one of several 
seemingly contradictory ways of describing our relationship to spirit and nature as the 
one that Emerson really meant. Alternatively, and I think more correctly, Emerson was 
attempting to describe an experience which cannot be captured adequately in words. He 
therefore offered a number of ways for conceiving this sacred relationship between 
ourselves, nature, and the divine. Like one of the blind men in the fable of the blind men 
and the elephant, Wilber has grabbed on to the description which most closely fits his 
preconceptions, proclaimed it correct and argued strongly against any other interpretation. 
Wilber's discussion of Emerson presents us with a dismaying puzzle. How could a man of 
Wilber's evident intelligence and knowledge make such a mistake?22 In my view, Wilber 
was led astray by his adherence to a fallacious equation of spiritual/psychological with 
social evolution in conjunction with an unresolved contradiction within his own spiritual 
awareness. Thinkers such as Emerson probe at the fault line in Wilber's evolutionary 
model, and challenge the contradiction within his own mind. Deep ecologists and the 
nature religions challenge both head on. To see why this is so we need to grasp the 
essential characteristics of Wilber's evolutionary model of psyche and society. 
Foundations of The Wilberian Model 
Wilber's theoretical framework is a synthesis combining three intellectual currents 
typified by the work of Jean Gebser, Jean Piaget, and Jurgen Habermas. For Wilber, the 
most basic of the three is the evolutionary view of spirituality first developed by Jean 
Gebser and argued for today by Georg Feuerstein as well as by Wilber.23 Of the three, 
Wilber is the best known, largely due to his unusually productive writing and the solid 
reputation he earned in transpersonal psychology. 
Within Gebser's basic framework of world wide spiritual evolution, Wilber incorporates 
Piaget's model of cognitive and moral development, extending it to levels of 
consciousness far beyond where Piaget himself stopped. He also incorporates Habermas's 
model of social and cultural evolution, which he again extends beyond Habermas's own 
boundaries. The result is a wide ranging framework for making sense of individual, 
social, and spiritual development along with a unilinear evolutionary trajectory. 
The Evolution of the Individual 
Jean Piaget's clinical work with children identified a series of cognitive stages they pass 
through as they develop. This developmental sequence stops finally with "formal 
operational thinking" characterized by the abstract, analytical, inferential, and 
hypothetical thought we associate with normal adulthood. People at this level of 
awareness possess both a highly developed self-consciousness and the ability to assume 
the perspective of others..24 
With Piaget, Wilber identifies a "magical-animistic" mode of consciousness characteristic 
of small children, from two to four years old.25 Their thinking is magical in the sense that 
they have an "unrestrained and unrefined belief in action at a distance. . . ."26 Their 
awareness is pre-personal in that the subject has not yet had the encounters which will 
force it to recognize its separateness from other things in the world. Far from being 
egocentric, small children have little sense of ego at all. 
Over time, growing experience with the otherness of the world undermines this 
prepersonal view, replacing it with a "mythic" level of awareness. The newly humbled 
child's feelings of magical omnipotence are initially transferred to others. The first such 
transfer of power is to its parents, who are considered virtually as powerful as gods.27 
This mythic, or "concrete operational," awareness is characteristically attained by 
children aged from six to eight. 
As the child matures further, increasingly "concrete operational" forms of awareness are 
replaced by "formal operational" thinking - the rationality of adulthood. Normally it has 
formed in modern children between the ages of eleven and fifteen. According to Wilber it 
is this level of consciousness which is manifested in the typical individuals and defining 
institutions of the modern world since the Enlightenment. 
At this point Wilber departs from Piaget's clinical work, arguing that we are on the brink 
of developing the next stage in consciousness evolution, which he terms "vision-logic." 
With the rise of vision-logic, rationality takes yet another step forward in its internal 
development. As Wilber says, "The whole point of rationality and its capacity for 
multiple perspectives is not simply to abstract the commonalities . . . but to put oneself in 
the shoes of others and thus find a mutual enrichment and appreciation of differences. 
This is the same world centric rationality [as characterizes formal operational thinking], 
but now celebrating all the multiple perspectives and not merely steamrollering them into 
monotonous uniformity."28 
Wilber argues that "vision logic," is holistic in character. It is able to reintegrate the 
dissociations that occurred between the true, the good, and the beautiful in the modern 
world. But it does so from a universal perspective rather than a particular culturally 
privileged standpoint. Vision logic, according to Wilber, is the final stage of human 
awareness before entering into the properly spiritual modes of consciousness which 
transcend the personal ego. 
These "transegoic" levels themselves consist of a series of stages which Wilber has 
distilled from accounts by religious mystics such as Plotinus, the Buddha, Meister 
Eckhart, St. Theresa, Nagarjuna, and others. The Psychic is the first transpersonal level of 
awareness. It manifests paranormal psychic abilities, spontaneous devotional feelings and 
Emersonian nature cosmic consciousness. Next is the subtle level, the seat of archetypes, 
Platonic forms, personal deities, and illumination. It is followed by the Causal level, 
characterized by unitive consciousness, that is the contemplation of the unity of the 
human and divine and absorption into the godhead. The highest level of consciousness is 
the direct experience of nonduality, where no divisions exist, and everything is equally 
the One.29 
Wilber's description of this hierarchical model of consciousness development with its 
roots in the work of Piaget and other psychologists and its topmost branches in accounts 
from the world's greatest mystics has earned him wide recognition in the field of 
transpersonal psychology. Were this all that Wilber argued, this paper would be 
unnecessary. 
The Evolution of Society 
The German social theorist Jurgen Habermas argues that a kind of parallel exists between 
the evolution of individual consciousness as described by Piaget, and the evolution of 
human societies. Thus, individuals and societies evolve in a broadly similar manner, with 
each being characterized at any given stage by a dominant level of consciousness.30 
Wilber agrees with Habermas's basic model, but again extends it further. 
According to Wilber, because each society is defined in part by its dominant level of 
consciousness, each level of society will possess a different sense of space-time, a 
different system of law and morality, different cognitive styles and self-identities, modes 
of technology, and drives and motivation. Each will also possess different kinds of 
personal pathology, social oppression and repression, degrees of death, seizure and 
denial, and types of religious experience.31 Wilber contends that early primitive societies 
mirror earlier forms of human awareness while in later more developed societies, 
dominant members possess higher forms of awareness. A qualitative hierarchy of 
societies and states of awareness can be discerned, with each example located along a 
single developmental continuum having both individual and social aspects. 
Human societies may be differentiated into three basic types, with a fourth now beginning 
to take form. Wilber labels these societal types magical, mythical, rational, and centauric. 
Early human societies were "magical-animistic" in character. Beginning perhaps 200,000 
years ago people began to be aware of their own separate existence. Supposedly, 
however, the boundaries between self and world were fluid. Cognitively, people confused 
subject and object, whole and part. While this kind of consciousness may sound mystical, 
Wilber contends that this "primary process simply can't tell the difference between the 
part and the whole to begin with."32 
Physical objects were experienced as being alive in a personal sense, and human beings 
did not differentiate themselves from nature. Instead, everything was connected, such that 
acting symbolically would lead to the same outcome as when acting `for real.' Sometimes 
even "telepathic hunting-magic" could happen.33 This is the world of "voodoo" and of 
totems. It is a world where humans and animals are kin, and indeed kinship was the basis 
for human relations as well. 
At this early stage "the logical, verbal, and conceptual mind is not developed."34 At 
most, the farthest advanced of those possessing magical consciousness probably 
possessed "paleosymbols, modifiers, commands, and some nouns."35 Social life was 
ordered by symbols rather than by complex rules, because from this perspective the 
object and its symbol are confused.36 The magical mode of consciousness was 
characterized by a deep belief in the law of similarity and law of contagion, fundamental 
principles of magic which, Wilber claims, demonstrate a relatively undeveloped mind. 
In these primitive societies, the highest level of awareness was reached by "a few - a very 
few - of the truly advanced shamans and medicine men. . . ." They had reached the 
psychic level of consciousness. But most people, certainly the average, were very 
primitive indeed, having on balance not advanced beyond the magical state. 
In a contention that will later prove crucial in evaluating his work, Wilber emphasizes 
that "Confusing . . . magic and the psychic - has had the most regrettable consequences 
for the science of man at large."37 Even most shamans, according to Wilber "clearly, 
were quite delusional or at least fraudulent, and in their pitiful attempts to exploit others 
into believing that they were quite exceptional and heroic souls, we see the saddest side 
of the Atman project at work. . . ."38 Still, he grants that some were genuine and "saw the 
All as yet through a glass very darkly. But saw they did . . ."39 
Around 12,000 years ago people discovered agriculture. It was at about the same time 
that humankind entered its next stage of consciousness evolution. While not arguing that 
farming caused this shift, Wilber tells us that "Impulse delay and control, the ability to 
postpone, channel, sublimate, and offset otherwise instinctive body-bound activities and 
typhonic magic - this is the expanded world of the farmer."40 The true cause of this shift, 
he suggests, was the final emergence of genuine language and a new awareness of the 
significance of death.41 The social and cultural stage was set for the rise of civilization. 
In time, some of these early agricultural societies became incorporated into larger social 
orders. 
As the scale of human society grew, the basis for social identity ceased being the kin 
group. Instead, the new mythic systems gave legitimacy to larger, more encompassing 
communities. Because of their all-encompassing claims, these myth based societies 
continually tended to expand, incorporating whoever lived along their borders. What held 
the whole together, along with military force, was a common acceptance of a single 
mythic world view. What limited their expansion was bumping up against a similar 
society with enough power to push back. 
According to Wilber, the rise of these mythic worldviews, and the social orders they 
sustained, marks the beginning of reason and abstract thinking. Empires with universal 
pretensions generated complex systems of rules, rules which could be considered 
independently of the external world. This development marked the first division of the 
noosphere from the biosphere. With this division it became possible to think about 
thinking. People increasingly began to see themselves as separate from their thoughts. 
They could then begin to examine the rationality of their own views.42 
By separating itself from the purely concrete, rationality inexorably leads people to honor 
impersonal common standards. As is most obvious with mathematics, such standards are 
free from the perspective of any particular society. This is why rationality makes 
expanded cooperation possible. However, in the process rational thought also quickly 
exceeds the bounds of mythic based societies. This is largely because the myths' 
universalistic claims cannot be rationally defended once encountering other myths 
making similar claims in other societies. Mythic society eventually outgrows its bounds, 
transforming itself into rational society. So far, this transformation has been 
accomplished most completely within the secular West, culminating in the 
Enlightenment. 
Because modern society is rational rather than mythic in its essence, Wilber argues that 
despite external appearances, the secular West exemplifies a higher stage of spiritual 
development than do earlier mythic societies. Modern rational awareness has finally 
discovered universal concepts and principles able to be applied everywhere and justified 
through persuasion rather than force. This development is profoundly moral. It signifies 
our willingness to subordinate ourselves voluntarily to a counter argument in the absence 
of a physical threat. All human beings are now seen as in principle equal, and so the 
sphere of rational benevolence eventually expands to include all people. 
The triumph of rationality separates right from might. With this development humankind 
attains its maximal differentiation from nature, where according to Wilber the rule of 
might has been basic. The noosphere is now completely distinct from the biosphere. 
The institutional expressions of rational society are the nation state, the market, and 
science. Each vastly expands the realm of human cooperation over what it had been in 
earlier societies. Each is sustained by rules which ideally apply to all equally. These rules 
themselves can be reflected upon by universal standards. 
Despite these achievements we have hardly attained the pinnacle of human development. 
The secular liberal nation state has unleashed forces which are presently transforming it 
beyond recognition. The world market, computer technology, and world science are 
creating the basis for a world culture, no longer purely Western.43 This first truly 
universal civilization will depend for its existence upon a new level of human 
psychological attainment: Wilber's "vision logic." However, before such a culture can 
arise, certain stresses and wrong turns within modern civilization will need to be 
addressed and overcome. In certain respects reason's triumph carried with it a deep 
distortion of consciousness, a distortion which threatens us today in the rise of the deep 
ecology movement and nature religion.
Two Dichotomies 
To grasp Wilber's argument, we need to understand two dichotomies he develops. The 
first distinguishes between "ascending" and "descending" modes of thought. The second 
differentiates between "Eco" and "Ego" camps within the descending category. 
According to Wilber, with very few exceptions such as Plato and Plotinus, the West's 
intellectual history has been characterized by "a battle royal . . . between those who 
wanted only to live in `this world' of Manyness and those who wanted to live only in the 
`other world' of transcendent Oneness."44 The "ascenders" focus only on the creator, and 
deny creation. By contrast, the descenders see only creation. Each is a partial view since a 
proper understanding unites the two "in one ongoing, everlasting, exuberant embrace."45 
When each recognizes its appropriate relationship with the other Ascent becomes Eros, or 
transcendental wisdom and Descent becomes Agape, transcendental compassion. When 
they are separate and alienated from one another, however, Eros appears as Phobos, and 
Agape as Thanatos. "Phobos is Eros in flight from the lower instead of embracing the 
lower." It is a source of repression. "Thanatos . . . is Descent divorced from Ascent. . . . 
compassion gone mad: not just embracing the lower but regressing to the lower. . . . It 
attempts to save the lower by killing the higher."46 
Christianity is fundamentally an ascending religion. When modernity arose, it did so in 
large part in opposition to the established Church. The Enlightenment was aggressively 
anti-mythical in spirit, honoring instead universal standards of truth through reason. But 
opposition to myths could easily become opposition to Ascent as such, since Christianity 
had attempted to monopolize its claim to the transcendent. In abandoning Christianity, 
modern reason also abandoned recognition of the transcendent. 
Unlike earlier modes of thought, rationality differentiated between art, science, and 
morality. Each was henceforth to develop along lines intrinsic to its character. In doing so 
rational differentiation made possible their growth and development. None was 
handmaiden to another. Wilber sees this as a positive achievement. But without a "vision 
logic" perspective able to appreciate the uniqueness of all three while simultaneously 
comprehending them within a holistic framework, differentiation became dissociation. 
Since the 18th century we have lived in an increasingly fragmented world lacking any 
deeper meaning, a world of the subjective and objective, with a vast and unbridgeable 
gulf between them. In such a world, truth, goodness, and beauty have no relation with one 
another. 
For Wilber, the "central problem of postmodernity" is to integrate what rationality had 
rent asunder.47 Accomplishing this requires a transformation of Western civilization, 
because "Instead of an infinite above the West pitched its attention on an infinite ahead. 
The West worshipped the "God of all that is visible, and all that can be seen, and all that 
can be grasped with the hands. . . ."48 All the warring currents within Western thought 
share this same descending frame of reference. 
Two basic orientations can exist within this basic descending "Enlightenment paradigm". 
In Wilber's terms, "does the good life consist in (1) following the autonomous agency of 
the rational ego in order to generate its own self-assured morals and aspirations, or in (2) 
connecting the ego with the wider ground of its shared communion in the natural world 
and thus finding something `larger' than the isolated ego?"49 These two choices Wilber 
depicts by the short hand of the "Ego" and "Eco" camps. 
In Wilber's view the current rise of deep ecology and the nature religions signifies a 
resurgence of the eco camp in its struggle with the dominant ego camp of Western 
civilization. But the standpoint of the "eco" camp is fatally flawed. The question it fails to 
answer, Wilber holds, is "just how does the ego insert itself into something larger without 
losing the positive side of the beneficial gains it had just made?"50 
Wilber does not view progress to higher evolutionary states as inevitable. Instead, he 
emphasizes how difficult it is to move from one stage of development to another. As it is 
outgrown, the tensions within a particular level of development begin to build. In our 
case, people are increasingly disenchanted with the promise and performance of the 
modern world. This dissatisfaction, while in some respects well founded, can lead to a 
powerful regressive temptation. The individual or society may then attempt 
psychologically to move backwards, to reinhabit forms of life it has outgrown, but which 
seem preferable to its present discomfort. 
Far from improving the human condition, the regressive temptation threatens to worsen it. 
At a time when humankind's task is to achieve a new integration with the world that 
retains the ego development and self awareness which we have attained through 
modernity, many people are tempted to flee back to a pre-egoic state of awareness, the 
mythic or even magical state. As Wilber puts it, "when culture is seen as only or 
primarily a repressive force, then the cure is regression, period. . . ."51 
The ego camp conceived of reason purely as an instrumental tool. Their eco critics 
correctly saw the shortcomings of such a perspective, where nothing possessed value any 
more. But they offered in its place "instrumental feelings, feelings that allowed us to fit 
into the web of life as a part and not try to dominate on the whole. Nature . . . was . . . 
disclosed to me primarily in feelings; nature was the sum total of what it evoked or 
awakened in me. . . ."52 Such a purely subjective internal experience can never lead one 
to the transpersonal. It points in the other direction. The allure of a supposed primal 
Arcadia, and the sense of belonging associated with pre-personal states of awareness can 
seem utopian and transpersonal. But in fact they are profoundly atavistic, harkening back 
to magical modes of awareness. It is this common confusion of prepersonal mental states 
with transpersonal states that Wilber calls the "pre-trans fallacy". Wilber claims 
ecophilosophers, particularly deep ecologists and nature mystics tempt us to look 
backwards toward a supposed paradise before human kind was polluted with culture and 
society. While deep ecology and nature worship and nature religion may claim to be 
transpersonal, in fact they are prepersonal to their core. 
The Eco-Romantic Threat 
Wilber's critique of deep ecology, and "eco-romanticism" in general, can be summarized 
in five basic contentions.53 
1. Eco-romantics confuse our differentiation from nature, which is a positive step, with 
dissociation from nature, which is not. In trying to overcome dissociation they also 
flee differentiation. This confusion leads eco-romantics to commit the "pre-trans" 
fallacy. They eulogize archaic indissociation in both its individual and social forms as 
"spiritual" and "holistic."54 Refusing to differentiate leads to "bioequality" where all 
living things "have equal value. A worm and an ape have equal value. This is quite 
common with deep ecologists . . . ."55  
2. In denying this differentiation, eco-romantics deny the very qualities of mind that 
make it possible for them to make their quest in the first place. Only people with a 
modern rational level of awareness could conceive of the problem and their proposed 
solution.  
3. Eco-romantics believe that at some point in the past a "Heinous Crime" took place 
that led to our fall from an earlier holistic paradise.  
4. Eco-romantics dislike modernity, based upon their desire to regain our supposed lost 
paradise of the distant past. Ecotheorists "necessarily see culture as a lamentable 
deviation" from our biological nature.56 
5. Eco-romantics rely upon either a purely empirical systems theory with no room for 
mind, or upon "biocentric feeling and sentimental emoting" which supposedly 
constitutes our true connecting links to the divine. 
Looking at this list, any honest observer acquainted with environmental thought will see 
familiar themes. All of these ideas are contending for dominance within the 
environmental movement, and some of them are also important currents within 
communities practising nature spirituality. The problem with Wilber's analysis of the 
environmental and nature spirit communities is not that the attitudes he criticizes do not 
exist. They do. And I agree that all five views are errors on the part of those holding 
them, although my reasons for disagreeing with these attitudes and beliefs will sometimes 
differ markedly from Wilber's. 
But Wilber's description of environmental thought is also a caricature. And it is a 
decidedly mean spirited one coming from someone priding himself on his supposed 
"vision logic" derived ability not only to place himself in the shoes of others, but to 
appreciate their perspective as well. We might expect such a description of environmental 
thought from the Wise Use movement or rapacious land looters. But we can reasonably 
ask for more from someone who claims to believe "one of the most urgent tasks of 
postmodernit - arguably the most urgent - is the development and establishment of a 
genuine environmental ethics . . . ."57 
Let us see whether Arne Naess fits into Wilber's description of ecotheorists, deep 
ecologists, and eco-romantics. Certainly Naess, who more than anyone else has made the 
deep ecology movement an important current in environmental thought, can be 
considered a good example of a supporter. Indeed, Naess, along with George Sessions, is 
author of the Platform Principles of the Deep Ecology Movement.58 And yet not one of 
Wilber's criticisms apply to Naess. I shall take them in the order I listed above. 
1. Taken out of context, a sentence from Naess seems to justify Wilber's criticism that 
deep ecology advocates eulogize the archaic indissociation of pre-egoic states, confusing 
dissociation with differentiation. Referring to the newborn baby's sense of connectedness 
with its environment, Naess observes "in a sense, it is this basic sort of crude monism we 
are working out anew, not by trying to be babies again, but by better understanding our 
ecological self."59 Much rests on what Naess meant by "in a sense." We can get a better 
idea by looking at Naess' more elaborated views of the ecological self in the same essay: 
To identify self-realization with the ego-trip manifests a vast 
underestimation of the human self. 
According to the usual translation of Pali or Sanskrit texts, Buddha taught 
his disciples that the human mind should embrace all living things as a 
mother cares for her son, her only son. Some of you who never would feel 
it meaningful or possible that a human self could embrace all living things 
might stick to the usual translation. We shall then only ask that your mind 
embrace all living beings, and that you realize your good intention to care 
and feel with compassion.60 
This in no way dissolves the self into a primordial ooze. As Naess observes, even as 
identification with others grows, Self-realization "breaks in and reinstates the central 
position of the individual - even if the capital S is used to express something beyond 
narrow selves. The widening and deepening of the individual selves somehow never 
makes them into one `mass'."61 
2. Wilber claims deep ecology denies the needed differentiation of humans from the 
environment. Of course, long before Wilber learned to write, ecocentrist Aldo Leopold 
had already observed that with the evolution of human beings "something new under the 
sun" had arisen: a form of life able to care about the well being of other species.62 Naess 
makes a similar point: "A specific feature of human make-up is that human beings 
consciously perceive the urge other living beings have for self-realization, and we must 
therefore assume . kind of responsibility for our conduct towards others."63 
Interestingly, the only time Wilber mentions Naess in his 800 some pages and 
innumerable attacks on deep ecology, is to quote him approvingly on recognizing the 
existence and appropriateness of hierarchy, that is, on the ability to differentiate. But in 
doing so, Wilber rhetorically separates Naess from deep ecology. He describes Naess as a 
"patron saint" whom "deep ecologists" should listen to, rather than a leading theorist and 
founder.64 
Since Wilber approves of Naess on this point, it may come as some surprise to him that 
Naess was partly responsible for the egalitarian terminology Wilber so dislikes. But 
Naess explained what he meant by it. "The principle of biospheric egalitarianism . . . has 
sometimes been misunderstood as meaning that human needs should never have priority 
over non-human needs. But this is never intended. In practice, we have for instance 
greater obligation to that which is nearer to us. This implies duties which sometimes 
involve killing or injuring non-humans."65 With George Sessions, another leading deep 
ecology supportrer, Naess wrote that "Humans have no right to reduce this richness and 
diversity [of life] except to satisfy vital needs." They elaborate that "The term `vital need' 
is left deliberately vague to allow for considerable latitude in judgment. Differences in 
climate and related factors, together with differences in the structures of societies as they 
now exist, need to be considered (for some Eskimos, snowmobiles are necessary today to 
satisfy vital needs)."66 
Elsewhere Naess observes that "any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, 
exploitation, and suppression. The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, 
or even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within . 
. . the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom."67 
I believe Naess's egalitarian wording was unfortunate, but any honest attempt to grasp its 
meaning would show that one can indeed make distinctions between human beings and 
others while respecting and honoring all life.68 Naess is hardly alone. The most accurate 
statement of many deep ecologists' views of human beings and nature is that our most 
unique capacities can be most completely realized only when we are able to respect and 
love all beings without exception.69 
3. To my knowledge, there is no mention by Naess of any primordial "fall" from paradise 
or any equivalent notion. 
4. Consequently, also absent from Naess' work is any desire to regain that lost paradise. 
Naess is no primitivist. In arguing for local autonomy and decentralization, he is not 
arguing for reversion to small independent villages or tribes. For example, when 
discussing how society might be decentralized, Naess suggests that "a chain consisting of 
local board, municipal council, highest sub-national decision-maker, a state-wide 
institution in a state federation, a federal national governmental institution, a coalition of 
nations, and of institutions, e.g. E.E.C. top levels, and a global institution, can be reduced 
to one made up of local board, nation-wide institution, and global institution."70 
Along with George Sessions, Naess argues that "Cultural diversity today requires 
advanced technology, that is, techniques that advance the basic goals of each culture. So-
called soft, intermediate, and alternative technologies are steps in this direction."71 Naess 
is hardly advocating a return to paleolithic hunting and gathering - which is one of 
Wilber's favorite characterizations of "deep ecology".72
5. Clearly, the leading deep ecological philosopher is not a theorist attempting to explain 
everything in terms of empirical systems theory. Mind plays an essential role in Naess's 
work. If Wilber wants to describe Naess's views about the ecological self as "sentimental 
emoting" he is free to do so. But he will be the first "spiritual" writer to so term such 
views. Naess is coy with regard to his views about the divine.73 But even if he finds no 
role for what we might term the transcendental, the least charitable interpretation will find 
in him an exemplary protagonist of Wilber's "vision logic." And it is far from clear that 
Naess denies such a role.74 
I think this brief overview of Arne Naess's writings demonstrates the complete 
inapplicability of Wilber's critique of deep ecology to the primary deep ecological 
philosopher. Nor is Naess alone here. But I am not writing a book, and so will not try to 
give a exhaustive discussion of deep ecological theory.75 
It would seem that at least powerful elements within the ecology movement would merit 
Wilber's enthusiastic endorsement as among the clearest examples of the vision logic 
which he argues is our next evolutionary step. Yet over and over Wilber virtually ignores 
those with whom he might find points in agreement in order to attack in the most 
uncompromising way the entire deep ecology movement. But there is much more going 
on here than simply Wilber's extremely selective picking and choosing from among deep 
ecological writers. 
Part II: In Defense of Nature Religion 
For reasons very well put by Emerson, encountering wild nature first demonstrated to 
many of us the inherent limitations within the dominant secular worldview. The 
environmental movement, particularly its deep ecological wing, and the contemporary 
revival of nature religions, are efforts to go beyond our culture's dominant secular and 
scientistic paradigm. These movements are broadly based, incorporating many different 
people and perspectives. Some have moved further from these limiting assumptions than 
others, who remain trapped within them. I have gone rather a far piece myself. Many 
avenues are being explored as environmental thinkers use their heads and their hearts to 
search for ways out of the social and spiritual dead end represented by contemporary 
Western intellectual orthodoxy. 
Unfortunately, as with his critique of Deep Ecology, when attacking nature religion 
Wilber prefers painting with broad brushes rather than attempting to truly understand his 
subject. For him, "nature religion" is perhaps even more regressive than deep ecology. 
His criticism is no better here than in his attack on deep ecology. In understanding why 
we will find a firm and beautiful foundation for deep ecological insights themselves. 
What is Nature Religion? 
Our task is hindered in part because Wilber never gives us a clear definition of what he 
means by nature religion. At least I have yet to find one. But he frequently links its 
supporters with environmentalism, particularly deep ecology, whose adherents find value 
in nature separate from the judgments which people make of it. He also links nature 
religion with bioregionalists, tribalists, ecofeminists, and those attracted to the spiritual 
beliefs of Pagan times. Another clue to Wilber's target is that when he was criticized by a 
prominent Neopagan, Wilber claimed that his critic's motives were a "defense of sorcery 
and magic," clearly a regressive position in Wilber's view.76 This charge is all the more 
significant because Wilber's critic never mentioned either sorcery or magic in a favorable 
context.77 So I think I am on sound ground with the following definition. 
By "nature religion" I refer to spiritual traditions which focus on the spiritual truths and 
symbols revealed by natural cycles, such as the turning of the seasons and phases of the 
moon. In addition, they often find spiritual meaning and instruction in natural processes 
such as sexuality and birth and death. Further, these religions focus to a substantial degree 
on spirit realms and phenomena that are not immediately transcendent in character, such 
as Coyote and Raven in many American Indian religions, the Kami in Shinto, and the 
Lord and Lady in the Wiccan tradition. They all emphasize that the most appropriate task 
for human beings is to live in respectful harmony with these forces rather than, as with 
many of the major world religions of today, viewing earthly existence as a way station, 
place of trial and testing, problem to be overcome, or otherwise a condition which is not 
ultimately satisfying. Consequently, nature religions tend to be genuinely pluralistic and 
respectful of other religious paths, for they do not claim to have the sole answer for the 
problem that is human existence. Indeed, there is no problem except for our confusions. 
This definition of nature religion includes shamanism, many tribal religions, and most 
contemporary Neo-Paganism. 
If these practices do not count as nature religions, I am not sure what would. Are they 
deeply regressive in either motivation or essence? A fair minded examination will lead to 
the conclusion they are not. 
Descending Into Confusion 
From this definition, we can see that Wilber has lumped two fundamentally different 
views of reality into his "descending" model, wherein he locates the nature religions. On 
the one hand are the secularists, who deny that a spiritual realm exists, or if it does, that it 
has any impact of importance upon the world in which we live. In Wilber's terms, they 
are "monological" because for them consciousness is fundamentally absent from nature. 
As a consequence, our relations with nature are not "dialogical" for we cannot enter into a 
relationship with the natural world. This group of people includes both traditional 
scientistic types (Wilber's "ego" camp) and those who argue for respecting and honoring 
purely "subjective" dimensions of experience as well, such as aesthetics and morality (a 
part of his "eco" camp). 
But the nature religions are dialogical. They emphasize that awareness permeates the 
world. We are never truly alone. Setting aside the issue of the transcendent for the 
moment, from their perspective the world is seen and experienced as inspirited. That is 
why so many tribal peoples say that we should treat everything, even the most seemingly 
insignificant, with respect. That is also why shamans experience the spirit world 
everywhere. And finally, that is why Neopagans see the sacred in the phases of the moon 
and the turning of the seasons. From these perspectives we are not dealing simply with 
insensate matter. We are continually immersed in psychic relationships in which even our 
thoughts matter. 
To be sure, both secularists and the nature religions focus on "manyness." But the kind of 
manyness focused on is different, and the motive behind the focus is different as well. 
Secular descenders focus on manyness because that is all there is. Further, their focus is 
either instrumental, with the world of objects existing as potential tools and resources, 
(Emerson's imbruted mind), or aesthetic and sentimental, a world of feelings. However, 
the nature religions focus on the world of manyness as a world of relations. This 
perspective is perhaps best captured by the Lakota phrase Mitakuye oyasin, or "all my 
relations" which can be even better, if less succinctly, translated as "For all the above-me 
and below-me and around-me things: That is for all my relations."78 This manyness is 
considered a blessing. 
Wilber shoehorns two fundamentally different types of awareness into his descending 
framework. They do not fit together very well because, in Wilberian terms, one is 
fundamentally monological, the other fundamentally dialogical. The dialogical 
perspective of the nature religions does not see truth, beauty, and goodness (science, art, 
morality) as dissociated. We live within an inspirited community, and the nature of that 
community actively defines the character of the true, the good, and the beautiful. 
Regressive Spirituality? 
Wilber might grant me my argument, and admit to imprecise terminology, but counter 
that my distinctions simply demonstrate that nature religions constitute regressive retreats 
to a magical worldview.79 His theoretical framework has yet to be undone. We need to 
examine the adequacy of his evolutionary model of social and psychological 
development. 
Insofar as we are concerned with nature religion, an obvious place to begin is with 
contemporary hunting and gathering peoples. To the degree they have maintained their 
traditional practices, they continue to live within an inspirited world where everything is 
alive and has its psychic component. 
When he wrote Up From Eden Wilber believed modern hunting and gathering peoples 
were contemporary examples of the "magical" worldview, or at least he used their 
practices as illustrative examples. He would have presumably agreed with Georg 
Feuerstein's rather unflattering stance towards existing primal peoples. "They are . . . 
anachronisms inasmuch as they have not made the leap into the mental-rational 
consciousness, but are still largely under the spell of the magical consciousness in its 
deficient form."80 The problem with this condescending view is that apparently they are 
not "under the spell" of the magical consciousness. They are as rationally competent as 
moderns. 
Today Wilber grants that modern hunting and gathering peoples, when tested, score as 
competently as modern urbanites in terms of their ability to think in "formal operational" 
terms. He seems to believe this poses no problem for his analysis. According to him 
today, the condition of modern tribes people tells us nothing about the mental 
development of Paleolithic peoples. Unlike modern hunting and gathering peoples "the 
first tribal societies as a whole did not evidence formal operational cognition in any of 
their actual, social structures: not in legal codes, not in conflict resolution, not in 
arbitration, not in modes of group or collective identity, not in worldviews, and so on."81 
But there is also no evidence that the early hunter-gatherers didn't possess formal rational 
consciousness. We do not have written records, we do not know the meanings of the cave 
paintings, we really have no direct knowledge of anything these early peoples thought. 
That is why these times are called prehistoric. We know still less about their worldviews 
and modes of conflict resolution, questions which leave no physical evidence. Therefore, 
we have no empirical reason to believe these people were mentally less acute than we 
ourselves. We can of course speculate to our heart's content. But in the absence of clear 
evidence, we need to evaluate the reasonableness of our speculations. 
Wilber tries to get himself off the hook by saying Jurgen Habermas has "demonstrated" 
his claims. But Habermas has not - nor does he claim to. At best Wilber has misread 
Habermas, who explicitly rejects interpretations such as Wilber's. In "Historical 
Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures" which Wilber cites in support 
of his views, Habermas emphasizes that "ontogenetically early stages of incomplete 
interaction have no correspondents, even in the oldest societies, for which (with the 
family organization) social relations have had from the beginning the form of 
complementarily connected, generalized expectations of behavior (i.e., the form of 
complete interaction)."82 Habermas explicitly labels preoperational thought, the kind of 
thought that Wilber claims applies to primitive hunting and gathering societies, as 
"incomplete interaction".83 
Habermas is arguing not that hunting peoples could not think clearly, but rather that these 
people did not distinguish the boundaries of their societies from the natural world, which 
is quite a different thing. He observes that "the personal identity of the individual 
developed through identification with a tribal group, which was in turn perceived as part 
of a nature interpreted in interaction categories. As social reality was not yet clearly 
distinguished from natural reality, the boundaries of the social world merged into those of 
the world in general."84 The similarities between cognitive development and social 
evolution is far looser for Habermas than for Wilber, who therefore cannot use him to 
support his more sweeping claims. 
As a secularist, Habermas sees this failure to distinguish society from nature as a 
shortcoming. Even so, he points out that it is the rise of systems of exploitation and 
domination that lead to the requisite differentiation. I will return to this question later, 
after disposing of Wilber's system. 
Habermas also emphasizes that human life as such is rooted in the family, which depends 
upon "the emergence of developed linguistic communication."85 Habermas can be 
difficult to interpret, but it seems to me that he cannot be reasonably read as saying what 
Wilber claims he does. Two to four year olds scarcely can be said to have a "developed 
linguistic communication." 
Setting Habermas aside, the fact that Wilber once used the cultural and religious practices 
of contemporary hunting and gathering peoples to illustrate "magical" modes of 
awareness, only later to acknowledge that moderns do not have that consciousness proves 
the inadequacy of using such practices to support his point. To the contrary, the existence 
of such practices provides evidence for the existence of formal operational rationality 
since they exist together in the only cases to which we have access. Therefore, all 
empirical examples of tribal practices that Wilber offers in support of his thesis actually 
better support the opposite conclusion. 
Ultimately, Wilber is probably pushed in the direction of Feuerstein's argument that the 
"psychic life and world-experience [of hunting and gathering peoples]. . . is markedly 
different from that of the contemporary urbanite. And the difference cannot be adequately 
explained by merely resorting to empirical functionalism . . . ."86 In other words, these 
peoples' experience of the world is different from modern human beings, and therefore 
cognitively inferior. If ever there were a circular argument this is it: Evolution towards 
higher consciousness exists, and the evidence that it exists is that tribal peoples have a 
different way of perceiving their world than I do. Because their consciousness differs 
from mine, my consciousness is more highly evolved than theirs (presumably because my 
culture can beat up more on their culture than theirs can on mine, which is why we are 
dominant). God, as usual, is on the side of the big battalions. 
There are very good reasons for completely rejecting claims about the supposed mental 
incapacity of our earliest human ancestors. The kinds of development Piaget described as 
taking place during childhood and leading to formal operational thinking are hardly 
unique to modern times. "Formal operational" thinking typically arises by the time 
children are between eleven and fifteen. The necessary experiences to develop the 
rational mind of a fifteen year old will as likely arise in a small group as in a modern city, 
as Habermas recognized. 
To argue otherwise, Wilber would have to point to practices in contemporary hunting and 
gathering peoples which can reasonably be said to have been absent in very early hunting 
and gathering societies, and which appear necessary for children to have the kinds of 
experiences necessary to develop formal operational reason. I cannot even begin to 
imagine what he might suggest. 
There are still other reasons for rejecting this model. The "pre-egoic" tribespeople of 
Wilber's and Feuerstein's imaginations could not clearly differentiate themselves from the 
world about them. They would be at the mental level Wilber ascribes to children two and 
four years old. Like such children, they supposedly lacked "Impulse delay and control, 
the ability to postpone, channel, sublimate, and offset otherwise instinctive body-bound 
activities and typhonic magic. . . ." 87 
We might ask how long a two to four year old, even one with adult physical capacities, 
would survive in a world populated by sabertooth cats, cave bears, and lions? How would 
these beings prepare for the winter, for in Europe, Asia, and North America these 
"children" survived and flourished during an ice age. Do four year olds paint beautiful 
pictures of animals or create finely worked tools? Chipping flint spear points, sewing hide 
clothing, making bone needles, fish hooks, and the other sophisticated tools of Cro-
Magnon societies certainly required foresight and the ability to postpone gratification. 
Most of us would not find chipping spear points worth doing for its intrinsic pleasure. 
Indeed, foresight was far more important for people in those distant times than for us 
moderns, cushioned as we are against the impact of personal improvidence by Social 
Security and Medicare. 
The claim that these people were barely able to speak is equally absurd. This is so for two 
reasons. First, we now know that even Neanderthals had the same small bone structures 
in their throats possessed by modern people, bones which make human speech possible. 
The hyoid bone, from which the voice box hangs, is indistinguishable between 
Neanderthals and modern humans.88 Second, we know that when new languages develop 
in the modern world, they do so spontaneously, and with complete grammars. This occurs 
when children of people who speak different languages play together. They develop a 
Creole enabling them to communicate easily and completely, through a new language 
incomprehensible to their parents. 
Creoles, the only new languages that have arisen entirely spontaneously, are not primitive 
in any sense. They have tight rules for sentence structure, grammar, and word order, 
articles and prepositions, inflections, tenses, and gender forms.89 The best evidence we 
have, then, says that our distant ancestors spoke a language that was both complete and 
complex. 
It is fashionable these days to attach to every critique of a Western point of view the 
claim that it reflects a "colonialist" and "imperialist" bias. I abhor this trend, for it is 
usually a favorite tool of second rate academics. But in the case of Wilber and Feuerstein, 
it is hard not to suspect that their put-downs of nature religions and tribal peoples stems 
from an entirely unmerited belief in their own superiority. This is why they so confidently 
write about the supposed inadequacies of peoples about which we know so little. 
Particularly galling to me was Wilber's claim that most shamans of the past, where we 
have no data at all, were "delusional," "pitiful," and "fraudulent." 
Quite appropriate is the response of Joseph Medicine Crow to claims such as these 
One thing is sure. This unusual and interesting individual was more than 
just the white man's stereotyped image. . . . He is depicted as deceiving his 
patient or subject with trickery and sleight of hand. It is said that he lived 
and thrived by imposing on the credulity of those who depended upon him 
and by asking exorbitant fees. 
On the contrary, the average Indian medical or holy man was a decent sort, 
hardworking, sincere, aware of the seriousness of his responsibilities, and 
dedicated to the individual well-being and general welfare of his people 
and community. It is indeed unfortunate that the true image of this 
indispensable man of the tribe and his genuine and great contributions have 
been so long belittled, tarnished, and obscured by the ethnocentric white 
man.90 
If modern representatives of hunting and gathering cultures are mentally as competent as, 
say, Ken Wilber, and continue to find their spiritual perspective convincing, as many do, 
this particular model of spiritual evolution faces a serious challenge. If there is no 
reasonable evidence that Paleolithic peoples were mentally less acute than we ourselves, 
this challenge grows stronger still, for the supposed parallel between Piaget's model of 
individual development and the course of social development breaks down at its 
inception. 
Fracturing the Psychic 
Wilber's argument that early peoples possessed a lower average level of consciousness 
than moderns is aided by his strange treatment of what he terms the "psychic" level of 
awareness. Wilber splits it in two. A part is demoted to the "magical" realm, and equated 
most of the time with purely subjective phenomena. The rest remains in the psychic 
realm. But Wilber then tries to argue away many of the most universally accepted 
features of that realm. What results is a confused and confusing collection of 
contradictory claims. 
Wilber's ploy is exposed in one revealing instance. He grants that during the "magical" 
stage of our social development early hunters sometimes practised "telepathic hunting 
magic" due to their belief in a kinship with totem animals and ancestors.91 Here, for 
Wilber, telepathy is clearly rooted in the "magical" world of indistinct boundaries. Yet 
within 40 pages, Wilber argues that the "magical body" was "not a truly psychic or 
telepathic body, but rather represented . . . simple `magical' cognition. . . ."92 Now 
telepathy has been relegated to the psychic level, practised at most by a few honest 
shamans. Telepathy shifted its roots from a magical identification with the animal world 
to the psychic realm. This seems to me a muddle. 
This confusion is accompanied by at least one other far more serious. Wilber quotes Giza 
Roheim, a secular psychologist and anthropologist, as saying that "all symptoms and 
defense mechanisms are a form of magic. . . . Primitives have magic in conscious form, 
whereas with us it can function only . . . if it is unconscious." Roheim, Wilber tells us, 
"put it just right."93 Today "infantile magic" is simply "neurotic conflict." 94 
Earlier Wilber had described the magical atmosphere of identification with our 
environment as characterized by examples such as "voodoo, where the practitioner, by 
sticking pins in a doll effigy, tries to effect a change in the actual person - and usually for 
the worse. This `works' because, to the magical mentality, the doll and the person are one, 
not symbolical."95 
These two arguments do not go together. Wilber now admits that tribal people, let alone 
modern Haitians, possess formal operational consciousness. But formal operational 
people do not use magic, he says, for now it exists in their unconscious, manifesting as 
neurotic symptoms. Yet some Haitians do use magic, and do so quite consciously. And 
Vodou, if Wilber had taken the time to study the subject, turns out to be a religion with 
many gods and goddesses, and is very far removed from either of his descriptions of 
magic. It is neither neurosis nor is it a sign that Haitians do not have developed egos. And 
they speak French. This is so despite their use of puppets.96 Wilber's argument breaks 
down into inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Historically magic has been anything but the provenance of mental children. Sir Isaac 
Newton was a practising alchemist. John Dee made advances in mathematics and 
astronomy, he also was a magician, and indeed founded "Enochian" magic. Practitioners 
of magic do not equate it with all of the psychic realm, but they universally describe it as 
one aspect of that realm. As such magic is very far removed from the level of awareness 
of a child. For example, while emotional energy is an important aspect of magical 
practice, it must be accompanied by clear visualizations and intense mental focus, by 
disciplined work and the ability to then "let go" and pay no further attention to the matter. 
In very many cases it involves interaction with the spirit world, which is considered very 
intricate and complex. 
A part of the credibility of Wilber's analysis of magic stems from his conflating 
contradictory conceptions of the word. Paiget, Roheim, and other secularists treat it as 
delusional. It confuses feelings and emotions with reality, and is purely subjective. At 
best it is the provenance of small children who do not yet understand their world. Wilber 
should have paid better attention to his definition in Eye to Eye that magic was the 
"unrestrained and unrefined belief in action at a distance."97 No shaman, magician, or 
Witch believes in this. No practitioner of Vodoo or sorcery believes in this. Magic as 
practised by tribal peoples and others is clearly distinguished by them from childhood 
awareness, and focuses in a disciplined way upon physically unseen powers and 
principles. The same word refers to two different universes of phenomena, real or alleged, 
depending upon who is using it. They describe different things. Neither is clarified by 
confusing it with the other. 
The incoherence of Wilber's conception of magic undermines his analysis in many places 
throughout Sex, Ecology, Spirituality. For example, according to Wilber, since the 
Paleolithic age, magic has been simply a regressive temptation to the human mind. Thus, 
when the rise of science began in earnest, "the Church, beginning around the sixteenth 
century, was involved in a war on two fronts: fighting regression to magic, and fighting 
supersession by science. The Galileos and the sorcerers were both introduced to the 
Inquisitor."98 But later, in a footnote criticizing Morris Berman, Wilber writes of "the 
early scientists who were also mystics, magicians, and/or occultists of various flavors. . . 
." He is referring to Berman's description, but lets it pass unchallenged, except that 
Wilber calls the same people "mystical scientists," obscuring just what they were.99 
Either the magicians and occultists were distinct from the scientists, as Wilber's basic 
model would contend, or they were not, as these sentences suggest. The historical 
evidence is that Berman's formulation is far superior to Wilber's. The Renaissance revolt 
against an ossified Aristotelian science was conducted by both mechanists and alchemists 
inspired by the Neoplatonic and Hermetic philosophies of Paracelsus and Agrippa. These 
latter took magic quite seriously. 
Mechanistic scientists argued that the heavens were simply inert matter, and so were 
subject to the same principles as was the earth. From their perspective both were 
desacralized. Their alchemical opponents, the magicians and occultists, argued instead 
that both the heavens and earth should be treated with reverence and respect. Each was, in 
its way, sacred. Both groups rejected the old qualitative division separating the earth from 
the heavens. Both groups advocated observation, experiment, measurement, and 
prediction. But the model of impersonal objectivism was argued for primarily by the 
mechanists. For the alchemists nature was not simply inert, and so experiments must be 
informed by the heart as well as the head. This view of nature was dialogical. 
Significantly, the alchemists were bitterly denounced by the mechanists on theological as 
well as philosophical grounds. The mechanists saw their mission not simply as serving 
science but also serving a purely transcendent God. To the extent mechanists did not fully 
endorse Descartes mechanism, they believed the only kind of spirits in nature were 
demonic. Those emphasizing that nature was alive were literally trafficking with the 
Devil. Significantly, the mechanists tended to support the witchcraft trials while the 
alchemists did not.100 Newton was attacked because of his reliance upon the "occult" 
force of gravity, which imbued matter with power, thereby supposedly making it 
competitive with God.101 
Clearly Wilber's simplistic ascending/descending dichotomy breaks down. In fact, the 
"descending" mechanism was philosophically dependent upon the existence of a 
transcendent (ascending) deity in order to get around the obvious objection that it could 
not account for consciousness. It was only later that mechanists decided rather 
incoherently that everything could be accounted for in mechanistic terms. The magicians 
and occultists, by contrast, worked within a framework able to encompass both ascending 
and descending insights. 
It is far from obvious that science depended upon the triumph of the mechanists. While 
there is not space to develop this argument in detail, a couple of quotations by Nobel 
Laureate Barbara McClintock prove suggestive. McClintock received the Nobel Prize for 
her discovery that genetic elements can move in an orderly way from one chromosome to 
another. Her breakthrough was intimately connected to her method of studying corn, the 
subject for her genetic studies. McClintock's approach was one of active engagement and 
sympathetic involvement with her subject. 
Evelyn Fox Keller quoted McClintock as saying 
No two plants are exactly alike. They're all different, and as a consequence, 
you have to know that difference. . . . I start with the seedling, and I don't 
want to leave it. I don't really feel I know the story if I don't watch the plant 
all the way along. So I know every plant in the field. I know them 
intimately, and I find it a great pleasure to know them.102 
McClintock's empathy did not stop with plants. She observed of their chromosomes that 
the more I worked with them, the bigger and bigger [the chromosomes] 
got. And when I was really working with them I wasn't outside, I was down 
there. I was part of the system. I was right down there with them, and 
everything got big. I was even able to see the internal parts of the 
chromosomes - actually everything was there. It surprized me because I 
actually felt as if I was right down there and these were my friends. . . . As 
you look at these things, they become part of you. And you forget 
yourself.103 
I hope that Wilber does not conclude that McClintock was regressing because her ego 
boundaries were not firm enough against the external world. Four year olds do not win 
Nobel Prizes. What McClintock is describing is empathetic identification, which when 
combined with affection becomes love. This is the attitude defended by the Neoplatonists 
against the alchemists. 
I think even the little I have presented on the development of science, and the importance 
of loving empathy in scientific research today, demonstrates the bankruptcy of Wilber's 
attempt to argue that science had an immaculate development free from the "regressive" 
influence of magic. Lynn Thorndike put the point quite accurately, saying that "magic 
and experimental science have been connected in their development; that magicians were 
perhaps the first to experiment; and that the history of both magic and experimental 
science can be better understood by studying them together."104 Further, at least one of 
those attitudes the magicians offered to science - treating the subject studied with respect 
as a subject, not impersonally as an object - has since proven enormously valuable. 
Finally, the triumph of mechanism over its alchemical competitor was not due to better 
science, but to better politics, for the mechanists were in harmony with a hard hearted 
Protestantism that desacralized all of nature in an ultimately futile attempt to honor their 
utterly transcendent deity. 
Wilber's other attempt to disparage the centrality of the psychic for much religious 
experience is his denigrating and explaining away the existence of a spirit realm of gods 
daemons, and other entities. In an unreferenced quote in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality Wilber 
says John Locke wrote that "We have reason to be persuaded that there are far more 
species of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being in degrees of perfection 
much more remote from the infinite Being of God, than we are from the lowest state of 
being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing."105 Locke was writing in harmony 
with the view that divine love and creativity was such that every kind of thing that could 
exist would exist as a gift of the One. Such a view carries troublesome implications for 
Wilber's analysis of both "magical" and "mythical" forms of society. And so he sets about 
eliminating its impact. 
Wilber tells us that 
. . . since there was definitely a gap between humans and the infinite 
Source, then that gap simply had to be filled by an almost infinite number 
of superior grades of intelligence, grades that, if they weren't exactly 
"creatures," were at least a series of infinitely receding higher Ideas and 
forever unattainable Perfections utterly beyond human reach. [my italics]
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Wilber tells us that in the Middle Ages these were mythologized as angels and the like. 
For Locke and Renaissance thinkers, according to Wilber, these higher powers were 
"simply postulated to exist. . . . they were a rational hypothesis put forward to `fill the 
gaps' between humans and Deity."107 No one, Wilber claims, really had first hand 
experience of such things. 
According to Wilber, for Plotinus and a few others, however, these higher dimensions 
were "potentials" present in each of us. They could therefore be consciously actualized by 
any person sufficiently spiritually developed. They were not "angels out there . . . . There 
is absolutely nothing other about them, except the otherness created by our own lack of 
inner awareness." For children the gods and goddesses exist, but once we grow up "the 
conceptual angels, are all within." In a bizarre sentence, Wilber writes that Locke's higher 
beings are "all experimental, contemplative, experiential realities that are directly 
disclosed to immediate awareness under the proper laboratory conditions."108 
It is by no means obvious that Locke and others considered these conclusions to be 
simply "postulates". In his superb history of magical and occult thinkers and 
organizations from the early Romantic period until the early twentieth century, Jocelyn 
Godwin observes that the best of them embody both Enlightenment values and deep 
personal involvement in magic. Godwin concludes that "The only possible explanation of 
this paradox is that for occultists of their caliber, magic was not a belief but an experience 
so concrete as to demand a scientific rather than a superstitious explanation."109 
Precisely. 
Let us look at Wilber's argument more carefully. Among Western thinkers, the Classical 
Neoplatonist Plotinus is Wilber's most admired authority. Plotinus did indeed believe that 
there were tutelary spirits which represented our higher potentials. But their relationship 
to us was quite different from that described by Wilber. In Plotinus's words 
. . . this guiding spirit to ourselves . . . is not entirely outside of ourselves; is 
not bound up with our nature; is not the agent of our action; it belongs to us 
as belonging to our Soul, but not insofar as we are particular human beings 
living a life to which it is superior. . . . while its presidency saves us from 
falling much deeper into evil, the only direct agent within us is something 
neither above it nor equal to it but under it: Man cannot cease to be 
characteristically Man.110 
Wilber does not tell us that Plotinus also believed that human beings living a subhuman 
life would be reincarnated as animals. Animals were also potentials - but in the other 
direction.111 I do not think Wilber would deny that in some useful sense animals are 
distinct from us. 
These tutelary spirits, then, are in one sense separate from ourselves, in another sense 
they are potentials. But the sense in which they are separate is important. Significantly, 
Plotinus also acknowledges the reality of spiritual possession: 
Those divinely possessed and inspired have at least the knowledge that 
they hold some greater thing within them though they cannot tell what it is; 
from the movements that stir them and the utterances that come from them 
they perceive the power, not themselves, that moves them. . . .112 
To be sure, perfect illumination finds one discovering that everything is the One, and is 
equally the One. But few are given such a gift. It is hardly a result of creating "proper 
laboratory conditions." For Plotinus, realizing the One comes through a gift from above. 
We can at most prepare ourselves for such a gift. For the rest of us, for Plotinus, and 
indeed, for everyone who has had any contact at all with the psychic world, the world of 
spirits and deities is also in important respects distinct. 
I can only assume that Wilber, perhaps having never experienced this dimension of the 
world, writes in complete ignorance of it. Frequently, those who practice nature religions 
will often have contact with the spirit realm, and while at some ultimate level we are all 
instances of the One, for all purposes of human existence short of complete illumination, 
these realities are separate in far more than trivial senses. The One also emanates as a 
truck, but I suspect Ken Wilber steps aside when a semi and he contest the same patch of 
street. 
Wilber's treatment of the psychic world is contradictory, confused, arbitrary, and deeply 
misleading. He is forced to split its reality in order to attempt to shoehorn the richness of 
human spiritual experience into his unidimensional evolutionary spiritual framework. 
I think these many confusions arise from Wilber's lack of comprehension of what is 
usually termed the psychic realm. I suspect no modern Westerner, if indeed anyone, truly 
comprehends this realm. I do not claim to. But I have had enough experience with and 
within it to know when at least some explanations do not even come close to grasping the 
matter. Wilber's is one of them. But in this article I am avoiding personal experience, lest 
I be accused of regressing, and keep simply to logic and history, Wilber's chosen venue. 
The Pre/Trans Fallacy Fallacy113 
Once we have seen how arbitrary Wilber's treatment of the psychic realm is, we can take 
a more critical look at his "pre/trans fallacy." This is supposedly the chief error 
practitioners of the nature religions are supposed to commit. 
Wilber offers an excellent rebuttal of the frequent claim that the consciousness of young 
children is somehow higher than that of adults. Piaget's research powerfully supports this 
kind of pre/trans fallacy analysis, and I have never seen the case made better than by 
Wilber.114 
Unfortunately, Wilber's muddled understanding of the psychic realm leads him to argue 
that psychic level experiences are always transcendent. This does not seem to be the case. 
Indeed, some are. But deities can also be experienced as separate entities. The shaman 
visiting the spirit world experiences his spirit helpers, and opponents, as distinct from him 
or herself. Published accounts of vision quests also describe the spirits and guides as 
something other than simply aspects of ourselves or of the One. Psychic healing 
frequently encounters alien forms within others which, once removed, result in a 
cessation of symptoms. In many of these examples the person having the experience has 
apparently left their normal body. 
I am not denying that at the most subtle levels, everything is the One. What I am denying 
is that very many people, if any, stay at that level of awareness permanently. When we 
are not at that level, we are in a world where individuality manifests as a primary aspect 
of existence. Part of the world of primary individuality extends into the psychic realm. 
So, these psychic experiences are not transpersonal experiences, but neither are they 
prepersonal. Yet they are clearly spiritual, in that they deal with orders of existence which 
are not material in the contemporary sense of that term. 
Part of the problem here may be an ambiguity in the meaning of "spiritual." The One or a 
high deity are spiritual in two senses. First, they are immaterial (the deity) or transcend as 
well as include the material (the One). Second, they manifest what we properly regard as 
spiritual values, such as perfect love. A thought form is merely immaterial. It is in that 
sense a part of the world of spirit, but does not manifest spiritual values. This is why a 
person who has never had an experience with the "spirit world" can be far more genuinely 
spiritual than one who consorts with spirits on a daily basis. Wilber may argue that he is 
speaking only of the high spiritual dimension when he writes of the psychic realm. But he 
then needs to account for the rest of it, a realm almost universally described by others as 
the psychic realm. Wilber's inflation of the pre/trans fallacy beyond its proper boundaries 
turns it into the "pre/trans fallacy fallacy". He appears to confuse the transcendent with 
the transpersonal. 
Wilber's Manicheanism 
Wilber emphasizes that humankind's evolutionary process takes place within a spiritual 
reality which ultimately is nondual. With this view I have no quarrel. From a nondual 
enlightened perspective, everything is equally the One. But for Wilber this realization can 
only be attained at the end of a long and very chancy evolutionary journey. Humankind is 
the first form of life, on this world at least, capable of ultimately attaining conscious 
union with Spirit. Even for human beings, this journey is long and its outcome uncertain. 
Consciousness proceeds through a series of stages, each with characteristic challenges 
and dangers. There is no guarantee of success. Wilber's universe is not a friendly one. 
While Wilber frequently emphasizes that, seen from an enlightened perspective, 
everything is holy and divine, he also evidences a deep and incessant undercurrent of 
intense dislike, even fear and contempt, for the physical world and all its works. This 
attitude repeatedly arises throughout his writing. Perhaps the mildest term by which 
Wilber refers to the world as we normally encounter it, that is, the world of samsara, is 
"ridiculous." 115 "We are yet the bastard sons and daughters of an evolution not yet done 
with us, caught always between the fragments of yesterday and the unions of tomorrow . . 
. ."116 But far from liberating, this evolution is a "nightmare."117 He writes of "the 
gruesome conditions known as life in this biosphere."118 The world manifests only "a 
pitifully small portion of God."119 As if any portion of God is "pitiful." Samsara is "a 
brutal place. . . . It is inherently a mechanism of terror. And people need to cope with this 
nightmare."120 Are we "Trapped in hell? Most definitely, as are all stages short of 
superconscient resurrection."121 As if this wasn't depressing enough, Wilber suggests 
that the higher evolution rises the greater the opportunities for things to go horribly 
wrong. Every one starts from scratch, and at every stage things can go wrong. The more 
stages the more nightmares of possible developmental miscarriages."122 Indeed, Wilber 
even goes so far as suggest that there may be no salvation for people in this nightmare 
world.123 Pain, nightmares, gruesome suffering, and horrible pathology - for eternity. 
At this point Wilber no longer resembles in any sense an advocate of nondualist 
spirituality. He has become a kind of Gnostic, viewing this world as a trap for Spirit, and 
nothing more. Like the Gnostics, birth is no blessing because "for any given individual, 
the moment of conception is the greatest point of actual alienation from conscious Spirit, 
simply because the individual has the most number of conscious stages to go through. . . 
."124 If this is true, bringing a child into the world is a form of child abuse! 
One wonders why a loving and compassionate Source would ever manifest such a ghastly 
place - and provide so little opportunity ever to leave it? Since Wilber says nothing of an 
after life and asserts we all start at the same place with next to none making it out, we are 
justified in suspecting that Wilber better describes a universe created by a demon than a 
place of divine beauty and sacredness. Wilber resembles a Gnostic fighting the Demiurge. 
And yet, this same man can write beautifully, and in the best nondualist fashion, that 
"The One manifests as the Many through an infinite act of compassion and charity . . . 
."125 It seems to me that Wilber is deeply conflicted in his own spirituality, alienated 
from a world he loaths but somehow believes to be the product of infinite love and 
compassion. I believe Wilber is torn between two contradictory spiritual paths, one 
seeking to escape the world, the other to love both it and the divine within and beyond it. 
This conflict, I think, is the reason for Wilber's core dislike of both deep ecology and 
nature spirituality. We who embrace these do not see our world as gruesome, ridiculous, 
pitiful, a nightmare and place of terror. As a consequence, we are not desperate to get off 
the wheel of life. Indeed, we see the Divine in the wheel of life, with death the price 
inevitably paid for the blessings of embodied existence. And death itself is a sacrament. 
On balance it is worth the bargain. Gary Snyder put this point well: 
`What a big potlatch we are all members of!' To acknowledge that each of 
us at the table will eventually be part of the meal is not just being `realistic'. 
It is allowing the sacred to enter and accepting the sacramental aspect of 
our shaky temporal personal being.126 
The ancient image of the Great Mother who gives birth and nurturance to her children, 
and then ultimately eats them, captures this insight at the mythic level, illuminating one 
of the meanings within life. Nevertheless, to grasp its meaning fully, we need to 
understand and integrate both sides of her image. She consumes in order to give birth. A 
rich, varied, and beautiful world offering a maximum diversity of ways of life to all its 
inhabitants requires each of us, sooner or later, to sustain others.127 
The Value of Nature Religion 
The contemporary revival of nature religions is a major effort to go beyond our culture's 
dominant secular and scientistic paradigm. For many of us moderns who have embraced a 
nature religion, it was our encounters with wild nature which first demonstrated to us the 
inherent limitations of the dominant Western worldview. 
Modern secular society has squeezed out ready access to the sacred within the purely 
human sphere. It is in nature that we most easily encounter a reality greater than human 
plans and aspirations, and do so with a minimum of distortion by our preconceptions and 
prejudices. Nature religion is hardly the only spiritual path open to human beings, but 
today it is a particularly powerful one. Spirit in nature reaches to us through beauty, 
through peace, through the openness of heart that it evokes within us, and through the 
meaning we experience in its silence. It helps us see that our worries and fears exist 
within a wider and deeper context that removes their urgency, soothing our minds and 
opening our hearts. Truly, as Emerson put it, "We are as much strangers in nature as we 
are aliens from God."128 
Nature religions focus to a substantial extent upon the psychic realm because they do not 
see human existence as a problem to be overcome, but rather as a blessing to be 
comprehended, and a gift to be mastered. We do so by living in a respectful and loving 
harmony with one another, with nature, and with the sacred. And so, far from being in a 
hurry for attaining transcendence, nature religions seek to honor the lives we are given. 
This view in no way denies a transcendent dimension to life. The transcendent, and that 
which embraces both the transcendent and the immanent, is truly there, it is responsible 
for all that is, it is honored and revered. But the nature religions do not reject the lives we 
are given or the beautiful and sacred world we inhabit in order to hurriedly try and evolve 
elsewhere. Everything can come in an appropriate time. Let us honor and revere what we 
have today. Let us keep our feet on the good earth as our hearts and minds open to 
embrace All That Is. 
Some people may grant us all of this, but still argue that nature religion is ill suited for the 
modern world of high technology and giant cities. It supposedly romanticizes the natural 
and denigrates the human world. This is also a misunderstanding. While many 
practitioners of nature religions, including this author, believe we are better off more 
integrated into nature and nature's cycles, this belief does not necessarily translate into 
antagonism towards either science or technology, let alone humanity. 
In what is the best study to date of contemporary Neopaganism, Margot Adler concluded 
that "contrary to my own expectations and the assumptions of various scholars, the 
majority of Neo-Pagans are optimistic about the uses of science and modern 
technology."129 Adler points out, and my own experience confirms, that Neo-Pagans are 
disproportionately attracted to scientific and computer oriented professions. Indeed, the 
largest single profession of Neo-Pagans answering a questionnaire she developed in 1985 
was "Computer programmer, systems analyst, or software developer."130 Clearly the 
Neo-Pagan community cannot be said to be in retreat from modernity, but rather seeks to 
grow through and transform it. 
Nature religion is a pure expression of a spiritual insight which can be powerfully 
expressed within an urban context. Today it is easy to forget that Plato, Aristotle, and 
other Classical philosophers, who were all town and city dwellers, wrote in a culture 
which extended without break back to the Neolithic and earlier. The Classical gods can 
be traced in many instances back to shamanic and totemic deities.131 Nor did most 
classical philosophers deny the existence of these gods, although they were highly critical 
of popular conceptions of them. 
A. H. Armstrong put this point well, saying that "There is . . . a deep rural archaism built 
into Mediterranean spirituality. . . " He continues 
It is of great importance always to bear in mind this continuity of archaic 
spirituality, carried by the holy places and immemorial observances, 
always there and underlying all the changes right down to the 
establishment of Christianity in the Roman Empire and after. It is the 
combination of this archaic base with often intensely sophisticated and, to 
us, modern seeming thinking and feeling that gives Hellenic and hellenized 
spirituality and culture its peculiar and enduring fascination. In the 
development of classical spirituality there were indeed changes. . . . But 
they were, almost without exception, changes in the interpretation of the 
old tradition, not changes that aimed at its destruction or radical 
reformation.132 
Classical philosophy differed from modern academic philosophy in that it sought the 
spiritual and psychological transformation of its practitioners.133 Like the earlier nature 
religions from which they ultimately descended, they tended to emphasize that we live 
most appropriately by being in harmony with the world, which is an expression of the 
good. To live in that harmony, they also tended to emphasize, like the Buddhists, that our 
suffering arose from our enslavement to our passions and desires. 
Pierre Hadot quotes Marcus Aurelius as saying there are many things 
if we look at them in isolation, . . . are far from being beautiful. 
Nevertheless, because they are incidental by-products of natural processes, 
they add to the beauty of these processes, and have an attractive effect on 
us. Thus, as long as one has a feeling for, and a deep understanding of 
Nature's processes, there is scarcely any of the things that occur as 
incidental by-products that will not present to one as pleasant, at least in 
some of its aspects. Such a person . . . will look upon the gaping jaws of 
wild beasts with no less pleasure than upon all the imitations of them that 
sculptors and painters offer us. With his wise vision, he will be able to 
discern the rich maturity of old men and women, as well as the lovely 
charm in young children; and there are many such things, which do not 
appeal to everyone, only to that person who has truly familiarized himself 
with nature and its workings.134 
To be sure, there are world-denying strains in some Classical philosophy. But these 
themes seem to me a reaction to the widespread and obvious injustices prevalent in the 
human society of the time. Immersed within a world of purely human affairs, the greater 
context of the natural world can be too easily lost from sight. 
I am struck with the fact that the spiritual systems of hunting peoples, those who are most 
deeply immersed within the natural world, do not see human existence as a problem to be 
resolved. Neither fallenness nor evil comprise essential parts of their cosmologies. Their 
spirituality focuses instead on living in harmony with both Spirit and natural rhythms. 
It is only with the rise of societies of rich and poor, powerful and weak, of exploitive 
hierarchies and perpetual war, that human life increasingly comes to be seen as possibly 
not a blessing. Suffering and injustice experienced at the hands of other human beings is 
quite distinct from suffering through a drought, famine or pestilence. The reason is that 
those causing the suffering are often seen to personally benefit from it. With the rise of 
such injustice to dominance within society, the basic goodness of existence can easily be 
called into question. 
The causes of humanity's nightmares are largely of its own making. They are not the 
result of nature. This is why, as Emerson so clearly saw, getting away into nature could 
open us up relatively easily to an intuition of the Divine that is truly in all things. For a 
society as saturated with secular values and purposes as our own, where nothing is any 
longer respected as valuable in itself, the spiritual role of nature can be expected to 
increase in importance. 
The nature religions, from European Neopagan to traditional American Indian, share in 
most respects a common worldview. The world is permeated by Spirit, and a spirit world 
of teaching and healing powers exists, a world able to assist human beings. This 
worldview has ancient roots in the pre-Christian West as well as in the rest of the world, 
and its renewed vitality among traditional American Indians and Neopagans suggests 
Spirit is reaching out to humankind through the one avenue of our experience still 
relatively unobscured by greed and ambition: the world of Nature. 
The nature religions constitute the true primordial tradition, whose insights have been the 
well-spring of inspiration for much that has been most noble within our own civilization. 
The similarities of spiritual worlds between the deepest thinkers of classical times and 
Native Americans can be striking. Compare these words of Black Elk, speaking of his 
vision, with Plato's story of the cave:
I am sure now that I was then too young to understand it all, and that I only 
felt it. It was the pictures I remembered and the words that went with them; 
for nothing I have ever seen with my eyes was so clear and bright as what 
my vision showed me; and no words that I have ever heard with my ears 
were like the words I heard. I did not have to remember these things; they 
have remembered themselves all these years. It was as I grew older that the 
meanings came clearer and clearer out of the pictures and the words; and 
even now I know that more was shown to me than I can tell. 
I saw my vision yonder once more . . . . I looked about me and could see 
that what we then were doing was like a shadow cast upon the earth from 
yonder vision in the heavens, so bright it was and clear. I knew the real was 
yonder and the darkened dream of it was here.135 
Nor was he the only Lakota to peer beyond Plato's cave. Speaking of Crazy Horse's 
vision, Black Elk's father had told him "that Crazy Horse dreamed and went into the 
world where there is nothing but the spirits of all things. That is the real world that is 
behind this one, and everything we see here is something like a shadow from that 
world."136 
An Alternative to Unilinear Evolution: Modernity, Nature, and 
Spirit 
In offering an alternative to Wilber's unilinear model of spiritual evolution, it seems to me 
important to offer an alternative interpretation of modernity's place in the world. If our 
society is not the pinnacle of all that has gone before, as Wilber would have it, is it simply 
a degeneration, as Emerson sometimes suggests? I believe it is neither. 
In my view, the modern West has indeed progressed in developing more inclusive and 
rational forms of social life. But it has done so while blinding itself to the reality of the 
psychic and other spiritual realms. Nor is this the only price our culture has paid. 
The modern world differs from its predecessors mostly due to the growth of the abstract 
human community with universal claims. These claims are of two sorts. First, that its 
principles apply to all human beings - a powerful step forward for the human race. 
Second, that this abstract human community legitimately always takes precedence over 
all other kinds of community membership - an illegitimate claim that devalues Spirit, 
nature, and concrete human communities such as families and neighborhoods. We have 
become so entranced by our new discovery in social organization, and the power it 
unleashed, that we have lost sight of the context within which it exists, and which 
sustains it. 
While modern Westerners have greatly increased the sphere of human cooperation, in 
large part through means that Wilber discusses competently, they have greatly diminished 
the depth of their connection and cooperation with the nonhuman world. This includes 
both the world of physical nature and the spiritual dimensions which permeate all 
existence. 
The West's gift to the wider human community is a framework for social life which 
provides through the development of science and the market, universal frameworks for 
cooperation, and, with liberal democracy, the first political form which does not wage 
war upon others of its own kind.137 These are no small achievements. But our culture 
lacks the ecological and spiritual grounding needed in order to maintain it. As a society, 
we have lived off the accumulated spiritual and moral capital of our Judeo-Christian 
heritage. But most of us no longer deeply believe Biblical theology. Scripture has been 
contradicted by science too often. Our ethical foundations in scriptural religion have 
grown weaker, and existing spiritual communities do not appear capable of maintaining 
them. 
Similarly, we have lived off the bounty of nature, and have similarly failed to maintain it. 
The secular and economistic mindset which functions as official rationality is inadequate 
to the task of maintaining sustainable relationships with the environment, let alone 
treating other forms of life with minimal respect or decency. The ethic of expediency and 
an individualistic time frame, coupled with modern technology, will not long preserve the 
fertility of the soil, the bounty of the seas, the sweetness of the water, the purity of the air, 
or the abundance and diversity of life. 
Unlike the revealed, both the nature religions and the contemplative traditions are rooted 
in personal experience. The nature religions focus primarily upon intermediate spiritual 
levels in the Great Chain of Being, with an attitude of thankfulness for the beautiful and 
sacred world within which we live. The contemplative traditions focus on the Source of it 
all. These differences are not mutually exclusive. In a way, they rest with each person's 
evaluation of the balance of suffering and blessing in the life they live. If we experience 
the blessings as primary, we are naturally attracted to the nature religions. If we 
experience suffering and dissatisfaction as primary, the contemplative traditions may 
speak more compellingly to us. But for many of us there is no deep contradiction between 
these paths, or in honoring and learning from both. There is suffering and blessing in 
every life. And sometimes the former turns out to be the latter. There is nothing inferior 
in the nature religions when human life is not experienced as a problem to be overcome 
and our beautiful and sacred world is not experienced as a nightmare. 
Environmental thought, particularly the Deep Ecology Movement, is at home here. It is 
through our experience with nature that we are rediscovering Spirit in the midst of that 
spiritual desert that is contemporary America. In that compatibility of nature religion with 
environmental thought is hope that the liberal West will rediscover its soul, and 
acknowledge that it exists as one among many communities, human and nonhuman, all of 
whom have as much claim for regard and respect as it does itself. Something must open 
the withered secular heart to the sacred, to wonder, and to love without possessiveness. 
More than anything else, nature seems capable of doing so. 
The perspective I am describing views social progress as very real, but contextual. Social 
progress is situated within communities, and can exist in some while not in others to 
which we equally belong. When any community unilaterally dominates all others, what 
was progress when confined within its appropriate sphere becomes increasingly 
dysfunctional and dangerous. Perhaps this is why some, like Emerson, see the modern 
abstract society and the secular values it promotes as a degradation, while others such as 
Wilber see it as progressive. It is both, depending upon different contexts, each of which 
is valid in its place. But by denying the spiritual, modern secularism can not ever fulfil 
the ultimate promises it makes. 
Because Spirit is everywhere, we always have the opportunity to grow in harmony with 
it. This possibility exists in all societies, although perhaps it is more difficult to 
accomplish in some than others. Social progress seems to me something quite distinct 
from individual evolution. It develops through a gradual extension of the breadth of 
human cooperation. To emphasize the contrast, individual evolution develops primarily 
through an increase in the depth of cooperation with others, manifesting most fully as 
unconditional love. As such individual spiritual evolution can happen anywhere and 
anytime. 
This perspective is in complete harmony with a nondual spiritual perspective and 
practice. Wilber says that, for Plotinus, one of the most important nondualist philosopher-
mystics of all time, spiritual "`Ascent' . . . means a change in perception so that more and 
more of the world is perceived as the other world - more and more of this world is 
perceived as Perfectly Divine, until there is only the Perfectly Divine in all perception. . . 
."138 All nature religions of which I have any knowledge would have no problem with 
this sentiment. But perhaps they already see the Divine in more than does Ken Wilber. I 
suggest he take to his own heart another quotation he gives us from Plotinus: 
Do not suppose that a man becomes good by despising the world and all 
the beauties that are in it. They [the Gnostics] have no right to profess 
respect for the gods of the world above. When we love a person, we love 
all that belongs to him; we extend to the children the affection we feel for 
the parent. Now every Soul is a daughter of the [Godhead]. How can this 
world be separated from the spiritual world? Those who despise what is so 
nearly akin to the spiritual world, prove that they know nothing of the 
spiritual world, except in name.139 
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